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NOTES
TE PROPERTY CONCEPT IN THE CALCULATION OF
PERCENTAGE DEPLETION: TiE DISJUNCTION
OF THE 1954 AGGREGATIONS
During the infancy of the oil and gas industry, the federal government
was sympathetic to its problems and needs. Congress, recognizing the
unusual risks involved in the discovery of the deposits of these natural
resources as well as the vast amounts of capital required for such ventures,
desired to make special concessions to the industry to encourage its expan-
sion and improvement. Prior to 1926 the producers of oil and gas employed
cost and discovery depletion in calculating their taxable income to take
into account the diminution in value of their investments resulting from
the exhaustion of the natural resources through current operations.' Dis-
covery depletion permitted the producers not only to recover their costs
but also to receive an allowance which would be available for reinvestment
in the industry.2 The Internal Revenue Service, however, found it difficult
to compute or to verify discovery depletion.
Congress, to eliminate the difficulties of discovery depletion, adopted
the method of percentage depletion which has been in effect since 1926V
The percentage depletion allowance permits a producer of oil and gas to
deduct twenty-seven and one-half per cent of the gross income from the
property 4 without regard to its economic cost. This amount cannot exceed
fifty per cent of the taxable income from the property before the allowance
for depletion, but the deduction shall not be less than the amount computed
on the cost basis.5 Therefore, a taxpayer can always recover his cost and
may recover a greater amount through the percentage depletion allowance.
Of primary importance in determining the permitted allowance is a
complete understanding of the term "property" as used in the Internal
1 Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 214(a) (10) (as to individuals), § 234(a) (9)
(as to corporations), 40 Stat. 1066, 1077.
2 The statutory rules concerning discovery depletion are discussed in 4 MERTFs,
FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION, §§ 24.09, 24.36 & n.18.1 (1960).
3 Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, §§ 204(c) (1), (2), 214(a) (9), 234(a) (8), 44 Stat.
14, 26, 41.
There were no substantial changes concerning the percentage depletion allowance
in the revenue acts from 1928 to 1938. Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, §§ 23(1), (m),
114(b), 49 Stat. 1658, 1686; Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289, §§23(l), (m), 114 (b),
52 Stat. 460, 495. The Internal Revenue Code of 1939 incorporated the same pro-
visions. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §§23(1), (m), 114(b), 53 Stat. 14, 45 (1939). And
later the basic provisions came into the 1954 Code. See INT. Rxv. CoDE op 1954, § 613.
4 For a discussion of the meaning of "the gross income from the property," see
MONTGOMEmY, FaDERAL TAXATION 12.10-15 (39th ed. 1964).
5 INT. Rrv. CODE OF 1954, § 613(a).
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Revenue Code. Prior to 1954 there was no statutory definition of
"property." The Revenue Act of 1954 corrected this deficiency,0 but in
the process inadvertently bestowed what later proved to be a substantial
tax benefit on the oil and gas industry. By 1963, congressional realization
of the extent of the tax benefit led to revision of section 614 in the Revenue
Act of 1964.7 This modification of section 614 has caused much confusion
and inconvenience in the industry. As a means of clarifying the concept
of "property," this note will trace its development, the problems it has
created, and possible resolutions.
I. HISTORICAL TREATMENT OF "PROPERTY" FROM 1939-1954
There was no statutory definition of "property" until the 1954 Code
went into effect. Until that time the taxpayer was guided solely by the
Regulations, General Counsel's Memoranda (G.C.M.), and the judicial
decisions. Under the 1939 Code, the Regulations provided an interpreta-
tion of the term "property":
(1) "The property" . . . means the interest owned by the
taxpayer in any mineral property. The taxpayer's interest in each
separate mineral property is a separate "property"; but, where
two or more mineral properties are included in a single tract or
parcel of land, the taxpayer's interest in such mineral properties
may be considered to be a single "property," provided such treat-
ment is consistently followed.8
The Regulations then defined "a mineral property" as "the mineral
deposit, the development and plant necessary for its extraction, and so
much of the surface of the land only as is necessary for purposes of mineral
extraction." 9 The "mineral deposit" was said to refer "to minerals in
place." 10 Finally, an interest was any economic interest in minerals in
place from which the owner derived income as a result of the severance
and sale of the mineral. Out of this income, the owner looked for a return
of his capital."
This definition of "property" presented numerous difficulties both to
the taxpayer and the Internal Revenue Service. Some problems, not dealt
with adequately by the Regulations, involved situations in which a taxpayer
had one lease covering two noncontiguous tracts of land but containing a
single mineral deposit, or in which a taxpayer acquired several leases
covering a single tract of land. To resolve such problems, the Service
6 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 614.
7Revenue Act of 1964, §226(a), (b), 78 Stat 94.
sTreas. Reg. 118, §39.23(m)-1(i) (1953). This rule had appeared in earlier
Regulations in substantially the same form. See Treas. Reg. 111, §2 9.23(m)-1(i)
(1941); Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.23(m)-1(i) (1940).
9 Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.25 (m)-1 (d) (2) (1953).
10 Treas. Reg. 118, §39.23(m)-1 (d) (3) (1953).
11 Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.23(m)-1(b) (1953).
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issued G.C.M. 22106.12 While in accord with the Regulations that two
or more separate mineral properties could be considered as a single prop-
erty provided the treatment was consistent, the G.C.M. declared that no
other combination of economic interests was permitted. In support of this
declaration, the Service stated:
The term "property" . . means each separate interest
owned by the taxpayer in each separate tract or parcel of land,
whether separated geographically or by conveyancing. If a tax-
payer holds several different interests in the same tract, each
interest is a separate property.13
One element of this rule, namely, separation by conveyancing, meant
that the taxpayer had as many separate "properties" as he had leases with
different persons.' 4 For example, if a taxpayer, A, acquired three con-
tiguous tracts of land from three separate owners, he would have three
separate "properties." Furthermore, when the interests of the taxpayer
were separated geographically, i.e., were noncontiguous, the taxpayer's
interests were in separate tracts or parcels of land, and were separate
properties. 15 Thus if A acquired three noncontiguous plots from one
owner in one conveyance for a single consideration, the geographical
separation created three separate "properties." Moreover, the last element
in the rule stated by G.C.M. 22106 required that "different" interests, for
example, oil payments and royalties, in the same tract of land, were also
to be considered as separate "properties." "I This principle may be demon-
strated by supposing that A, the owner of a certain plot of mineral land,
leased one-half of it, and operated the other one-half of it. The working
interest and the royalty interest from the lease would then be considered
"different" interests, and, A therefore would have two "properties."
1
2 G.C.M. 22106, 1941-1 Cum. BULL. 245.
Is Ibid.
14 Ibid.
Cases in which courts have considered this element include: J. T. Sneed, Jr., 40
B.T.A. 1136 (1939), aff'd, 119 F.2d 767 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 686 (1941)
(a taxpayer was not permitted to treat the income from numerous leases, producing
and nonproducing, and acquired at different times, as though the leases constituted
one property); Allie M. Turbeville, 31 B.T.A. 283 (1934), aff'd, 84 F.2d 307 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 581 (1936) (a lessor was not entitled to depletion on
bonuses from leases covering nonproductive acreage, and the bonuses could not be
combined with the income from leases covering productive acreage); Vinton Petro-
leum Co., 28 B.T.A. 549, aff'd, 71 F.2d 420 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 601
(1934) (a taxpayer, who had combined the gross income from eight contiguous
properties acquired at different times, was required to compute its depletion allowance
on the gross income from each separate acquisition).
1' G.C.M. 22106, 1941-1 Cum. BuLL. 245, 247.
For a recent judicial application of this element see Bryant's Estate, 34 T.C. 501
(1960), aff'd, 290 F.2d 807 (4th Cir. 1961) (twelve quarries, widely separated geo-
graphically, had to be regarded separately).
16 G.C.M. 22106, 1941-1 Cum. BuLL. 245. See also G.C.M. 22332, 1941-1 Cum.
BULL. 228 for the Service's treatment of "different" interests. "Different" interests
were also created by a complex arrangement in Herndon Drilling Co., 6 T.C. 628
(1946).
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The Service was determined to construe strictly the term "property"
in accordance with its rulings. A major reason for its refusal to approve
the combination of separate economic interests was that each depletable
property was also an asset subject to sale or other disposition giving rise
to gain or loss. The Service stated that:
Failure to treat each such separate interest as a separate property
would disregard or unduly confuse the administration of the pro-
visions of the Revenue Acts requiring the computation of gain
or loss upon the sale of an asset and the provisions distinguishing
between ordinary gain or loss and capital gain or loss, taxable
at different rates, depending upon the length of time the asset
was held.
17
Taxpayers, however, continually pressed for a liberal interpretation
of the "property" concept as was evidenced by their struggle with the
Service in the courtroom. In two early cases, Mascot Oil Co.18 and
William Cree 19, the taxpayer succeeded in merging two "different" inter-
ests, but the Service quickly expressed disapproval of the decisions. How-
ever, in Helvering v. Jewel Mining Co.,20 the court allowed itself to be
guided by the Regulations and judicially established three conditions for
combining two mineral properties for depletion purposes. The first condi-
tion was that the income from both properties be consistently treated by
the taxpayer as arising from a single property. Secondly, the court re-
quired the taxpayer to own similar interests, either freehold or leasehold,
in both properties. Finally, the two properties had to be included in a
single tract or parcel of land.21
In Jewel Mining Co. the Commissioner claimed a deficiency in the
taxpayer's income tax for the year 1936 on the ground that the taxpayer
erroneously combined income from two separate properties in computing
the depletion allowance. The issue was whether the mineral interest
covered by the sublease of which the taxpayer was the sublessor con-
stituted a separate property from the mineral interest on the overlying
17 G.C.M. 22106, 1941-1 Cum. BULL. 247.
1829 B.T.A. 652 (1933), appeal dismissed, 75 F.2d 1009 (1935). In this case, a
lessee, who had developed a property, gave a sublease to the Standard Oil Company
of California granting it the exclusive right to drill and explore for oil and gas
at a depth below 1600 feet. The bonus, which the lessee received from Standard Oil
for the property, was combined by the lessee with the income from his working interest.
The Board held that the term "property" meant the land acquired by the lessee under
the original lease, so that the combination of the bonus with the income from the
working interest was permitted.
1947 B.T.A. 868 (1942), nonacq., 1943 Cum. BuLL. 29. Here, taxpayers were
assigned two oil and gas leases plus fractional interests which provided for partici-
pation in the working interest. The Board held that there were no essential differ-
ences between a lease and a participating interest, when the taxpayer acquired the
leaseholds, as well as the fractional interests in rights thereunder sold by the lessee.
A merger of the interests was thus effected.
20 126 F.2d 1011 (8th Cir. 1942), reversing 43 B.T.A. 1123 (1941).
21126 F.2d at 1013.
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lease which was retained by him. The Board of Tax Appeals concluded
that, although the taxpayer had two properties, they could be considered
as one since he was consistent in his treatment. On appeal, the court,
though agreeing with the Board as to consistency, reversed the decision
and held that the two properties could not be combined, since the unity
.of interest required by the Regulations was not present. The court stated
that, since the taxpayer had a working leasehold interest in one mine,
and a non-working royalty interest in the mine under the sublease arrange-
ment, the combination of these "different" interests would be contrary to
the rules developed by the Service. After the Jewel Mining Co. case, the
"different" interest concept and the consistency of treatment requirement
became solidified in the courts.2
The Berkshire Oil Co.2 case provided the Tax Court with an oppor-
tunity to interpret the "separate tract or parcel of land" requirement for
combining two mineral properties. In that case a taxpayer had acquired
four lots by a single lease. Only two of the lots were contiguous on one
entire side, while the third lot touched only the corner of the second, and
the fourth lot touched the corner of the third. The taxpayer argued that
the four lots constituted three properties, i.e., the two contiguous lots con-
stituted one property, and the two lots touching at the corners made up
two distinct properties. The Commissioner contended that the four lots
constituted a single property "having a unitary basis, which includes the
intangible drilling and development costs of all wells drilled on any of the
lots, and that a loss deduction may not be taken when a portion of the
acreage was abandoned, but must await final disposition of the lease." 
24
Although the case did not involve the Code sections on depletion allowances,
the court stated that "property" had the same meaning in the "loss" sec-
tions as in the depletion sections and held that the two lots which touched
only at a common corner were not contiguous.2 The noncontiguous lots
covered in the lease were, therefore, separate tracts or parcels of land. The
aggregation of the two contiguous lots was permitted, and the taxpayer
was able to deduct his costs as a loss on "a property." 26
Thus from the 1939 Code sections pertaining to the depletion allow-
ance, and from the interpretation given to these sections by the Service
and by the courts concerning the "property" concept, it could be concluded
that all contiguous areas contained in a lease or in separate leases
2 7
2 E.g., Island Creek Coal Co., 30 T.C. 370 (1958) (issue of consistency);
Herndon Drilling Co., 6 T.C. 628 (1946) ("different!' interests) ; Clover Splint Coal
Co., 15 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 860 (1946).
23 9 T.C. 903 (1947).
24 Id. at 910.
25 This conclusion was based on the decision in Anvil Hydraulic & Drainage
Co. v. Code, 182 Fed. 205 (9th Cir. 1910).
26 Berkshire Oil Co., 9 T.C. 903, 911 (1947).
27 The Service has usually considered all contiguous areas contained in separate
leases executed at the same time from the same owner as a single property for per-
centage depletion purposes. This rule now appears in the present Regulations. Treas.
Reg. § 1.614-1(a) (3) (1961).
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executed at the same time from the same owner constituted a single tract
and could be treated as a single property 2 8 On the other hand, those
interests included in separate leases from separate owners were separate
tracts or parcels of land even though the areas were contiguous. And if
the taxpayer's interests within the same tract or parcel of land were dis-
similar, each dissimilar interest constituted a separate property.
Under these rules, however, certain anomalies existed. For example,
if a person, leasing three separate properties, acquired from three separate
lessors, transferred his interests to a third person, the transferee could then
consider the interests as one property. Although both transferor and
transferee possessed the same land, the transferor was considered to have
had three "properties" while the transferee had only one.
Another anomalous situation was presented when a previously segre-
gated leasehold interest terminated, and full ownership revested in the
lessor. The Service first concluded that in such a case the lessor's interest
was a single property. 9 However, a later ruling attempted to distinguish
the consequences flowing from different forms of termination by stating
that when a lease expired at the end of a contractual term, such termination
did not in any way enlarge or alter the other interests or "properties" owned
by a taxpayer, but that if the lease interest was forfeited or repurchased
by the owner of the land, prior to expiration, the minerals attributable to
the former royalty would still have to be considered a separate property 30
And since the owner had two "different" interests, aggregation was pro-
hibited. Thus even though the legal character of the interests as "lease"
and "royalty" had disappeared, the Service insisted on maintaining an
artificial separation of the nonexisting interests for tax purposes.31
Notwithstanding these artificialities, the oil and gas industry was
prospering and, for the most part, satisfied with the definiteness of the
existing Regulations. Producers of oil and gas were content to combine
contiguous interests within a single lease and to consider the lease as a
single "property."
But the definition of "property" used by the Service to tax the oil
and gas industry was also applied to the hard mineral industry. Hard
mineral producers desired to handle one or several mines as a single
property and were thus seeking to obtain either a different definition
of property or more liberal aggregation rules. Although largely unsuc-
cessful with the Commissioner, the hard mineral interests, after a series
of cases, began to persuade the Tax Court to permit producers to treat
as one property mines covering a number of tracts or parcels of land.
28 Compare text accompanying notes 14-16 supra. This aggregation of properties
in a single lease can be referred to as the lease-rule. For a discussion of the lease-rule,
see Hearings on the Tax Recommendations of the President Contained in His Mes-
sage Transmitted to the Congress January 24, 1963 Before the House Committee on
Ways and Means, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 116 (revised March 27, 1963).
29G.C.M. 22106, 1941-1 CGm. BuLL. 245, 248.
30 G.C.M. 24094, 1944 Cum. BuLL. 250.
31 Ibid.
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Black Mountain CorpY2 was one of the early cases in which a com-
bination of two separately conveyed interests was permitted. Over a period
of years, the taxpayer had acquired separate contiguous coal properties
which were assigned to two separate mines. The two mines, were treated
as separate properties by the taxpayer. The Commissioner contended that,
according to G.C.M. 22106, each separate acquisition had to be treated
as a separate property. The court, however, agreed with the taxpayer
and stated that:
Separate acquisitions can, under proper circumstances, be com-
bined to form one property and, likewise, under proper circum-
stances, one acquisition may become a part of two different
properties for this purpose.
33
Contrary to the Regulations as construed by the Memorandum,3 4 the Tax
Court accepted the taxpayer's definition of "property." "Property" was
said to mean the economic and practical unit which the taxpayer must use
and develop in order to extract a particular block of coal.85 Thus the
development, plant, and surface land necessary for the extraction of a
particular block of coal, and whatever portion of the mineral deposit which
could properly be mined as a unit were included in the "property." The
Black Mountain court relied on the Jewel Mining Co. case but failed to
see the important factual distinctions. In Jewel Mining the mine had been
obtained by a single lease, while in Black Mountain Co. the taxpayer
acquired the mine by several leases. The Black Mountain court rejected
application of G.C.M. 22106 because it thought that it would be difficult
and inconvenient for the taxpayer to determine the income from each
separate acquisition. °
Again, in the 1949 Amherst Coal Co. case3 a court applied the
Regulations on depletion contrary to the construction placed upon them
by G.C.M. 22106. There the taxpayer mined coal from three mines
situated on land covering an area of 4,600 acres and acquired at various
times between 1912 and 1940, either in fee or by lease. Because the
land was all contained within a single boundary, the taxpayer consistently
computed percentage depletion as if its income from mining derived from
a single property. The court decided that the taxpayer met all three ele-
ments of the test prescribed in the Jewel Mining Co. case. The income
from the operations was consistently treated as arising from one prop-
erty, the taxpayer owned the properties either in leasehold or freehold,
and lastly, all of the taxpayer's acquisitions were contained within a
32 5 T.C. 1117 (1945), nonacq., 1946-2 CUM. BULr 6.
33 5 T.C. at 1121-22.
34 G.C.M. 22106, 1941-1 Cum. BULL. 245.
35 Black Mountain Corp., 5 T.C. 1117, 1120 (1945). The court anticipated what
later became known as the "operating unit," see text accompanying note 52 infra.
365 T.C. at 1120.
37 11 T.C. 209 (1948), nonacq., 1949 Cum. BULL. 5.
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single continuous boundary. The court again rejected the Commissioner's
contention that according to G.C.M. 22106 each separate acquisition of an
interest in each seam of coal, either by lease or in fee, constituted a sepa-
rate property so that seventeen rather than one property existed. Thus,
the courts in dealing with the hard mineral industry departed from the
"separation by conveyancing" rule established by the Service. 38
The above cases demonstrated that the definition of "property" and the
aggregation rules as construed by the Service were inadequate, in the
courts' view, to meet the demands of hard mineral producers. The Com-
missioner, nevertheless, was unwilling to accept a mine as a single property
if it consisted of several separately acquired leases. When Congress set
out to draft the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, the need for clarification or
revision of the concept of "property" was stressed by the producers of
hard minerals.
Spokesmen for the hard mineral industry asserted before the House
Committee on Ways and Means that under the 1939 Code, Regulations,
and Rulings, the taxpayer might be required to separate into artificial
units, several tracts of land that actually constituted one producing unit.
The spokesmen argued that the taxpayer was the person who knew best
his operations and what could most appropriately be treated as one produc-
ing unit. It was thought completely artificial to treat properties as separate
simply because they were acquired at different times.3 9
In its General Report on section 614, the Senate committee discussed
the necessity of a statutory definition of "property." 40 One of the problems
pointed out was that the definition of property, evolved from the adminis-
trative regulations, required the preparation of multiple depletion schedules
and computations where a single computation would have served the same
purpose.41 Congress failed to consider, however, those differences between
the oil and gas industry and the hard mineral industries which called for
separate tax treatment.
4 2
II. INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954, SEcTION 614
Under heavy pressure from hard mineral producers, Congress placed
into the 1954 Code the first statutory definition of "property." 43 This
38 See Tennessee Consol. Coal Co., 15 T.C. 424 (1950) (a taxpayer who leased
certain "fringe" areas to other operators was able to treat the lands as a single
property); Cresson Consol. Gold Mining & Milling Co., 11 T.C. 192 (1948), appeal
dismissed, 175 F.2d 774 (10th Cir. 1949) ("split-check" leases granted to others did
not prevent the taxpayer from considering his holdings as one property); Rialto
Mining Corp., 15 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 496 (1946) (taxpayer was able to treat its two
mines as one property even though the land was acquired by several leases).
39 See Hearings Before the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of
Representatives, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 18, pt. 13, at 1982-87, 2114-16 (1953)
(remarks of Henry B. Fernald, Chairman of the Tax Committee of the American
Mining Congress, and Lovell H. Parker, Chairman of the Special Tax Committee
of the National Coal Association).
40 S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 80 (1954).
41 Ibid.
42 Id. at 80-81.
43 INT. REv. CoDE oF 1954, § 614(a).
1965]
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definition closely followed the definition used in the 1939 Regulations and
succeeding G.C.M.'s, i.e., "each separate interest owned by the taxpayer
in each mineral deposit in each separate tract or parcel of land." 4 Section
614(a) was not amended by subsequent revenue acts, and remains in the
Code at the present time.45 The Regulations construing section 614(a)
define an interest as "an economic interest in a mineral deposit." 46 An
economic interest includes "working or operating interests, royalties, over-
riding royalties, production payments, and net profits interests." '1 The
1954 Regulations state that "the term 'tract or parcel of land' is merely
descriptive of the physical scope of the land to which the taxpayer's interest
relates, . . . [but] is not descriptive of the nature of his rights or
interests in the land." 4 The rule that all the contiguous areas included
in a single conveyance constituted a single tract or parcel of land was
retained by the new Regulations. 49 These Regulations also retained the
rule that separate conveyances from separate owners were separate prop-
erties, even though the areas described were contiguous.50 If it were not
for a subsequent subsection, the mere codification of this definition of
"property" would have been of little value to the taxpayer and would
have only provided the Commissioner with greater authority for his original
position. However, any problems that might still have existed under
section 614(a) for the producer were greatly alleviated by the broad
aggregation rules in section 614(b).
Section 614(b) 51 set forth the most significant modification in the cal-
culation of percentage depletion in the 1954 Code. In an effort to satisfy
the demands of the hard mineral producers, Congress permitted the tax-
payer to elect to combine two or more separate operating mineral interests
to form one aggregation provided that the aggregated operating mineral
interests constituted part or all of an operating unit.52  Those interests
not included in the aggregation were to be treated as separate properties. 3
Although only one aggregation of operating mineral interests was allowed
in an operating unit, the aggregated operating interests did not all have
to be on the same tract or parcel of land or included in contiguous tracts
or parcels of land.5 An "operating mineral interest" was defined as an
44 See G.C.M. 22106, 1941-1 Cum. BuLL. 245-47.
45 See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 614(a). See generally BREEDING & BURTON,
TAxATioN OF OIL AND GAs INcomE 194 (1954).
4 6 Treas. Reg. § 1.614-1 (a) (2) (1961).
47 Ibid.
4
8Treas. Reg. § 1.614-1(a) (3) (1961).
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
1 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 614(b), 68A Stat 210 (amended by 72 Stat. 1633
(1958), as amended 78 Stat 94-96 (1964)).
52 INT. RE. CODE OF 1954, § 614(b) (1) (A), 68A Stat 210 (amended by 78 Stat.
94-95 (1964)).
M INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 614(b) (1) (B), 68A Stat 210 (amended by 78 Stat
94-95 (1964)).
54 NT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 614(b) (1), 68A Stat. 210 (amended by 78 Stat
94-95 (1964)).
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interest, the cost of production of which was taken into account by the
taxpayer for purposes of computing the fifty percent limitation on per-
centage depletion.5 5 These interests did "not include royalty interests or
similar interests, such as production payments or net profit interests."
The latter interests were called "non-operating interests." 7
The impact of this subsection can only be appreciated when its effect
on the basic definition of "property" is examined. The "separation by
conveyancing" rule was now of only slight importance, since all acquisi-
tions in the same operating unit could be combined. Likewise, the con-
cept of "geographical separation" was rendered meaningless since lots,
whether contiguous or noncontiguous, located in a single operating unit,
could be aggregated. The lease, which previously described the limits of
an aggregation, was now replaced by the much broader concept of the
operating unit. Now instead of preventing the aggregation of all "different"
interests, Congress allowed all "operating mineral interests" to be combined
and "non-operating interests" to be combined under special circumstances, 8
although the Regulations prohibited the aggregation of operating with
nonoperating interests.59
Thus the only function of the "property" definition after 614(b) was
to aid the taxpayer in determining whether he did, in fact, have separate
"properties." Once this determination was made, the taxpayer no longer
had to deal with the term "property," since the "operating unit" concept
had its own special rules for aggregation. Of course, if any interests were
not aggregated under section 614(b), the "property" concept remained
applicable to the separate interests.
The net result of section 614(b) was that Congress, in order to
resolve the problems of the hard mineral industry, established a new con-
cept of aggregation which enabled the oil and gas industry to aggregate
mineral interests on a much broader scale than it had ever previously done.
The "operating unit", as construed by the Regulations, 60 contemplated
aggregation only of interests which could conveniently and economically
be operated together as a single producing unit.0 ' Thus, interests geo-
graphically widespread were not to be considered parts of the same
operating unit merely because one set of accounting records was maintained
by the taxpayer or merely because the products of the interest were
55 Treas. Reg. § 1.614-2(b) (1961).
56 Ibid.
57 See Treas. Reg. § 1.614-5(g) (1961).
6 8 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 614(c), 68A Stat. 210-11 (amended by 72 Stat. 1634
(1958)) (now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 614(e)). Under the section as originally
enacted in the 1954 Code, the taxpayer had to prove that undue hardship would result
if he could not aggregate nonoperating interests. Ibid. The undue hardship require-
ment is not presently in force. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 614(e). For a discus-
sion of the present requirements see text accompanying notes 84-87 infra.
59 Treas. Reg. § 1.614-2(b) (1961).
60 Treas. Reg. § 1.614-2(c) (1) (1961).
6 See ibid.
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processed at the same treatment plant62 Although operating units varied
in size and content from one taxpayer to another, there were certain factors
which were indicative of such a unit. Mineral interests were said to be
operated together when there were common field or operating personnel,
common supply and maintenance facilities, common processing or treatment
plants, and common storage facilities.6 In the case of hard mineral
producers, this concept of an "operating unit" was relatively easy to
determine. Since the concept was also applicable to the oil and gas indus-
try, however, a problem arose in determining the boundaries of a unit
which had never before been recognized by oil and gas producers.
There was continuous disagreement between the large producers of
oil and gas and the Internal Revenue Service.6 While the producers tried
to make the operating unit as broad as possible, the Service wanted to
restrict its size and content. The large oil and gas producers obtained
an appreciable tax benefit from the aggregation rules after agreements
were reached with the Service as to the size of the operating unit. By
combining those interests which had a high cost of production with those
interests which had a low cost of production, the taxpayer was able to
overcome the fifty percent limitation and maximize the permissible per-
centage depletion allowance.
Example:
Corporation X has three operating interests within a single operating
unit.
INTERESTS AGGREGATION
A B C A, B, C
Gross Income from the
Property $100,000 $100,000 $100,000 $300,000
Cost of Production 70,000 20,000 35,000 125,000
Taxable Income from the
Property 30,000 80,000 65,000 175,000
7 Depletion (2732 of
gross income but not to
exceed 50% of taxable
income from the property) 15,000 27,500 27,500 82,500
From this example, it is evident that when the taxpayer made this ad-
vantageous aggregation, he was able to deduct 82,500 dollars for depletion
instead of the 70,000 dollars which would have been the deductible amount
had the interests been treated as separate properties. Thus the larger
the operating unit, the better was the taxpayer's opportunity to form
beneficial aggregations.
62 Ibid.
183 Treas. Reg. § 1.614-2(c) (1) (1961).
64 Small producers of oil and gas did not have a sufficient number of interests
to form large operating units. The conflicts, therefore, over the limits of an operating
unit involved for the most part the larger producers.
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However, the taxpayer was faced with the problem of determining
which properties to aggregate and which to treat separately in order to
maximize the depletion allowance. With each operating interest he had
to make an election whether or not to aggregate for whichever of the follow-
ing taxable years was later: (1) the first taxable year beginning after
December 31, 1953, or (2) the first taxable year in which the taxpayer
made any expenditure for exploration, development, or operation with
respect to the separate operating interest after acquisition. 5 Once the
election was made, it was binding for all future years.6 6 Since the tax-
payer had to elect at the exploration stage, it was usually most difficult for
him to determine with certainty the future prospects of a potential deposit.
The aggregation benefits might, therefore, prove to be short lived so that
the taxpayer would have been in a better position had he kept the interests
separate.
Example:
Corporation X, after maldng a favorable aggregation the first year, had
development expenditures in interest C, and thus the interest was thrown
into a loss position.
INTERESTS AGGREGATION
A B C A, B, C
Gross Income from the
Property $100,000 $100,000 $100,000 $300,000
Cost of Production 20,000 30,000 150,000 200,000
Taxable Income from the
Property 80,000 70,000 (50,000) 100,000
9 Depletion (27Y2 % of
gross income but not to
exceed 50% of taxable
income from the property) 27,500 27,500 0 50,000
Had the taxpayer maintained interests A, B, and C as separate prop-
erties he would have had an allowance of 55,000 dollars. But the allowance
in the aggregation was only 50,000 dollars because the taxpayer was re-
quired to subtract the loss of one interest in the aggregation from the
taxable income of the others. Should the losses on this interest within the
aggregation persist, the taxpayer would be at a definite disadvantage.
These rigid election rules, however, were rendered ineffective, since
at the time the service attempted to clarify the "operating unit" concept, it
also permitted new elections to be made to correspond to the more recent
interpretation. Because there was a delay in publishing the Regulations
5 See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 614(b) (2), 68A Stat. 210 (amended by 78 Stat
94-95 (1964)).
66 Ibid. However, the interest could later be given different treatment by consent
of the Secretary of the Treasury. Ibid.
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construing section 614, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued T.D.
6138, on August 19, 1955, granting each taxpayer the right to revise
elections under 614(b) on or before the last day of the third month follow-
ing the month in which the Regulations under section 614 were published
in the Federal Register. 7 Since the Regulations were not published until
January 10, 1961,68 the taxpayer had the experience of seven years to help
him in his determination of which interests to aggregate. On April 21,
1961, the Commissioner, to supplement T.D. 6138, issued T.I.R. 315 which
delegated authority to District Directors of the Internal Revenue to con-
sent to the redetermination of invalid aggregations in the light of the new
Regulations. Extensions of time up to six months beyond May 1, 1961,
were granted to taxpayers to make elections or revise old ones.6
In addition to the fact that the taxpayer, during this period, was able
to revise his elections, he was able to change the scope of his operating
units, since no agreement had been reached between the Service and the
taxpayer as to the outer limits of the unit. Engineer revenue agents in
states such as Oklahoma, Texas, and Louisiana accepted the oil field or
closely related oil fields as the scope of the operating unit. Other tax-
payers were establishing operating units based on:
(i) the entire operations wherever located,
(ii) company districts, or divisions, or
(iii) each state, county, parish, or oil and gas field.7' 0
As late as 1964, the Internal Revenue Service still had to issue
guidelines to further aid in determining what constituted an "operating unit"
in the case of oil and gas properties.71 The Service declared that "the term
operating unit refers to production or extractive activities, as opposed, ...
to drilling and development activities." 72 Thus, the aggregation would be
permitted only if the extractive activities indicated that the interests were
reasonably and normally operated together as a single property. "Extrac-
tive activities . . . [referred to] the day-to-day activities primarily con-
cerned with bringing crude unrefined oil and gas to the mouth of the
well." 73 The "operating unit" included those oil and gas operating mineral
interests whose extractive activities were under the immediate direction
of a single individual. 74 In other words, the operating unit could be no
larger than that segment of a taxpayer's producing operations that were
supervised by the lowest foreman in his organization.
07 T.D. 6138, 1955-2 CuM. BULL. 891.
68 See 26 Fed. Reg. 145 (1961).
69 T.I.R. 315, P-H 1961 FED. TAx Sray. 54,769. The taxpayer had to demon-
strate hardship rather than mere inconvenience in meeting the May 1 filing date. Ibid.
70 TULANE 11TH INST. ON FE. TAx 246 (1962).
71 Rev. Proc. 64-23, 1964-1 CuM. BULL. 689.
72 Id. at 691.
7- Ibid.
7
4 Id. at 692.
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III. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1958
While the oil and gas industry and the Service were attempting to
find a suitable limit on the operating unit concept, the hard mineral industry
was attempting to attain more favorable legislation. The hard mineral
producers were not completely satisfied with section 614(b) of the 1954
Code because they wanted to aggregate all of the operating mineral interests
in a mine or mines, and to make as many aggregations within a single
operating unit as they desired. Section 614(b), however, permitted the
taxpayer to form only one aggregation in an operating unit. It was for
this reason that Congress, in 1958, added section 614(c) to the Code.
The new provision allowed the hard mineral producers to form more than
one aggregation of operating mineral interests within an operating unit,
so long as each aggregation consisted of all the operating mineral interests
which comprised any one mine or any two or more mines35
The 1958 amendments also fulfilled a request made by certain oil and
gas producers. Specifically, Congress permitted the oil and gas industry
to use the 1954 rules concerning aggregation, or to treat any property
as though the 1939 Code continued to apply.70 Thus the small producers
and those larger producers who found it convenient to compute depletion
on an individual lease basis could take advantage of the 1939 rules. But
most larger producers were not interested in returning to the lease-rule,
since the potential tax benefits under the operating unit concept were
greater. When in 1963 Congress fully realized this fact, the time was
ripe for action.
IV. REVENuE ACT OF 1964
At hearings before the House Committee on Ways and Means,
Secretary of the Treasury, Dillon, stated:
The grouping practices that have evolved in recent years have
been used to minimize taxes in a way that does not seem to have
been intended by the 1954 legislation and does not accord with
sound and ordinary business practices in the oil and gas industry.77
Since the 1939 lease-rule worked satisfactorily in the case of oil and gas,
but had not proved adaptable to the hard mineral industry, the Secretary
recommended repeal of the aggregation section only for the oil and gas
industry.78 The dilution of the fifty percent limitation and the vagueness
of the "operating unit" concept gave additional support to his recom-
mendation.
79
75 IxT. REV. CODE or 1954, § 614(c), 68A Stat. 210-11 (amended by 72 Stat. 1634
(1958)) (now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 614(e)).
76 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 614(d) (added by 72 Stat 1637 (1958)).
77Hearings on the Tax Recommendations of the President Contained in His
Message Tranmnitted to the Congress January 24, 1963 Before the House Committee
on Ways and Means, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 38 (revised March 27, 1963).
78 Id. at 117-18.
79 Id. at 117.
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The following table illustrates the extremes to which some producers
went in order to obtain the full advantage of the operating unit concept:
Examples of Aggregations Claimed under the Operating
























































487 226 261 265 320
549 194 355 285 255
914 512 402 250 190
591 432 159 180
488 266 222 225 165
506 192 314 595 180
336 126 210 158 150
unknown - 575 325
80 Id. at 289. (Footnote deleted.) This table was prepared by the Treasury
based on the tax returns of several oil companies.
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The Secretary also presented two examples in which the taxpayer, by
using the operating unit principle and avoiding the net income limitation,
had been able to increase greatly his percentage depletion allowance.8 '
Example:
For the years prior to 1954, Companies X and Y computed percentage
depletion on a lease-by-lease basis. When the new aggregation rules went
into effect in 1954, the companies began employing the operating unit
principle. The following table demonstrates the extent to which the
companies avoided the fifty percent limitation, and were able to increase
their average effective rate of percentage depletion for later years:
Average Effective
Method of Rate of
Tax Year Depletion Employed Percentage Depletion
Company X 82 1952-54 lease-rule 24.9%
1954 operating units 26.0%
Company Y 83 pre-1954 lease-rule 24.3%
1955 operating units 25.4%
amended 1955 larger operating units 26.3%
The oil and gas producers, however, strongly opposed the Secretary's
recommendation. Industry spokesmen pointed to the heavy tax burden
already borne by the producers 8 4 and to the likelihood that increased taxes
would cause producers to decrease the amount of drilling for new reserves,
since the development of some properties would be less attractive.85 The
industry also tried to rebut the Secretary's recommendations concerning
the "operating unit" concept. The spokesmen argued that there were
already sufficient restrictions placed on the ability of the taxpayer to
aggregate since (1) the interests had to be in the same operating unit;
(2) an aggregation once made was binding; and (3) only one aggregation
was permitted in each unit.86 The industry also contended that since the
81 Id. at 282-83.
82 The percentage depletion allowance for Company X was increased by $5,307,782
for 1954 by the use of the operating unit principle. Id. at 282.
83 Company Y increased its percentage depletion allowance by approximately
$10,000,000 by avoiding the fifty percent limitation in changing to the operating unit
principle. Id. at 283.
84 See Hearings on H.R. 8363 (Revenue Act of 1963) Before the Senate Com-
mittee on Finance, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 5, at 2383-84 (1963) (remarks of Dr.
Richard J. Gonzalez, Director, Humble Oil and Refining Company).
Dr. Gonzalez pointed out that the taxes on petroleum and its products averaged
about $2.64 per barrel of crude oil:
a. Excise taxes on gasoline $1.95
b. Income tax liability on domestic crude oil production .48
c. Severance and property taxes on domestic petroleum operations .21
ToTAL $2.64
85 See id. at 2359-61 (remarks of Dr. Gonzalez) ; id. at 2386-89 (remarks of
Wallace W. Wilson, Vice-President, Oil Division of Continental Illinois National
Banking & Trust Company of Chicago).
86 See id. at 3714 (remarks of Dr. Gonzales).
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Service would have to establish a workable definition for the "operating
unit" for the years 1954-1963, and since many taxpayers had already
settled this issue with the Service, it would be administratively easier to
continue the existing aggregations than to dissolve the invalid ones.
8'
The partial validity of this argument, however, was overshadowed by
congressional concern with lack of uniformity in applying the "operating
unit" concept.
A, Revised Section 614(b)
Congress could not be persuaded to keep the "operating unit" concept
in effect for the oil and gas industry, and, in 1964, section 614(b) was
amended.88 This section now provides that producers of oil and gas must
treat all of their operating mineral interests in a separate tract or parcel
of land as one property unless they elect to treat the interests as separate.8 9
Thus the "operating unit," as the outer limit of aggregation, was replaced
by the separate tract or parcel of land. The amendments to section
614(b) and their application can best be explained by the following
example.
A taxpayer has operating interests, A, B, C, D, and E in a single
tract or parcel of land. If the taxpayer does not make an election under
revised section 614(b) (2), then all of the interests must be combined to
form one property. The taxpayer, however, may elect to combine A, B,
and C and keep as separate properties D and E. Should a new interest,
F, be discovered on the same tract of land, it will be combined with the
A, B, C, aggregation unless the taxpayer elects to make it a separate
property. F cannot be combined with D or E, for only one aggregation
is permitted on a single tract of land.
Section 614(b), however, deals solely with operating mineral interests.
The Code contains a separate section applicable to nonoperating mineral
interests9 ° This is section 614(e), which permits a taxpayer who "owns
two or more separate nonoperating mineral interests in a single tract or
parcel of land or in two or more adjacent tracts or parcels of land" to
aggregate all such interests in each separate deposit, and to treat them
as one property."' Adjacent tracts are those "in reasonably close prox-
imity."9 12 Aggregation of nonoperating interests is conditioned on proof
to the Commissioner that the taxpayer is not motivated chiefly by tax
avoidance.93 Prior to the 1958 amendments, nonoperating interests could
only be aggregated after the taxpayer proved that he would sustain "undue
87 Id. at 2401-02.
88 Revenue Act of 1964, § 226, 78 Stat. 19, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 614.
8 9 I T. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, §§614(b) (1), (b) (2).
9 0 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §614(e).
91 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §614(e) (1).
92 Treas. Reg. § 1.614-5 (d) (1961).
9s Ibid.
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hardship" if the interests could not be treated as one property.94 Thus,
although the rules for aggregating nonoperating mineral interests have been
liberalized, the Commissioner still retains considerable control.
Since nonoperating mineral interests were not included in the "operat-
ing unit" concept, only the aggregations of operating mineral interests
were affected by the 1964 Revenue Act. If the aggregations made by
producers under the "operating unit" concept do not satisfy the require-
ments of revised section 614(b), the taxpayer is faced with the problem
of allocating the basis of a now invalid aggregation to the separated
interests. Proposed Treasury Regulations provide two methods of effecting
this allocation. 5 The first method, the fair market value rule, requires
the taxpayer to multiply "the adjusted basis of the [invalid] aggregation
by a fraction the numerator of which is the fair market value of such
interest and the denominator of which is the fair market value of such
aggregation." o6 For example, suppose an invalid aggregation with an
adjusted basis is equal to 12,000 dollars, and the fair market value of the
aggregation is equal to 20,000 dollars. Interest A has a fair market
value of 5,000 dollars; B, 10,000 dollars; C, 5,000 dollars; computed as
follows:
Basis to A = 3,000 Basis to B = 6,000
5,000 10,000
X 12,000 = 3,000 - X 12,000 = 6,000
20,000 20,000
Basis to C = 3,000
5,000
-X 12,000 = 3,000
20,000
The second means of allocating the basis is known as the allocation of
adjustments.97  Under this method the adjusted basis of an individual
interest in an invalid aggregation is the adjusted basis of the interest at
the time such interest was first included in the invalid aggregation, adjusted
for that portion of those subsequent adjustments to the invalid aggregation
which are reasonably attributed to such interest. The adjusted basis of
the individual interests cannot exceed the adjusted basis of the invalid
aggregation. 8 For example, suppose the cost of interests A, B, and C
was 10,000 dollars each, and the total adjustments to the invalid aggre-
gation were 20,000 dollars, allocable to interests A, B and C in the amounts
of 3,000 dollars, 12,000 dollars, and 5,000 dollars respectively. This
adjustment must be a reasonable allocation that can be attributable to the
94 Treas. Reg. § 1.614-5(a) (1961).
95 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.614-6(a) (2) (ii), 30 Fed. Reg. 2666 (1965).
9 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.614-6(a) (2) (ii) (a), 30 Fed. Reg. 2666 (1965).
97 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.614-6(a) (2) (ii) (b), 30 Fed. Reg. 2666 (1965).
98 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.614-6(a) (2) (ii) (b) (ii), 30 Fed. Reg. 2666 (1965).
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individual interests "based on records of production or on any other facts
which establish the reasonableness of the determination." 99 The adjusted
basis of the invalid aggregation equals 10,000 dollars. When the taxpayer
treats A, B, and C as separate interests, their bases will be 7,000 dollars,
no dollars, and 5,000 dollars respectively. Their total adjusted bases,
computed individually, equal 12,000 dollars. Because the total of the
individually adjusted bases equals 12,000 dollars these individual bases will
have to be appropriately reduced so that the sum equals 10,000 dollars. 100
Allocation of bases will not be a pervasive problem, however, since
percentage depletion will probably have wiped out any cost basis that may
have existed on most of the interests. If little or no basis remains in a now
invalid aggregation, most producers will probably not go to the expense of
making the necessary allocations. Furthermore, those interests in which
cost depletion would have exceeded percentage depletion were probably
kept as separate properties by the taxpayer. Should any basis, however,
still exist for an invalid aggregation, it will be a difficult task to make
reasonable allocations. Thus this area may cause some dispute between
the taxpayer and the Service in the future.
B. Unitization or Pooling Agreements (Revised Section 614(b)(3))
Although the operating unit concept has been removed from the Code
for the oil and gas industry, Congress did provide the industry with a
method of combining the oil and gas interests of different owners in the
1964 amendments. The producers' need for such a method has been
increasingly felt in recent years as technological developments have pro-
vided opportunities for achieving significant economies in the process of
extracting petroleum products. These opportunities arise because oil and
gas are located underground in a porous rock reservoir, or common source
of supply, and because such a reservoir often lies beneath several separately
owned tracts of land. Since production causes the minerals to drain
toward the operating, well, unitization may be needed during primary
recovery to protect the adjacent property owners. After the primary
recovery has been completed, the remaining oil can be extracted by
secondary means of recovery. Reserves of oil and gas have been greatly
augmented with the improvement of secondary means of recovery coupled
with the use of unitization agreements. Provision was made for these
pooling and unitization agreements in the 1964 amendments, by creating
an exception to the rule that only operating mineral interests in each
separate tract of land can be aggregated.1 0 '
The proposed Regulations construing the 1964 amendments state that
a unitization or pooling agreement exists, when "two or more persons
99 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.614-6(a) (2) (ii) (b) (i), 30 Fed. Reg. 2666 (1965).
100 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.614-6(a) (2) (ii) (b) (ii), 30 Fed. Reg. 2666 (1965).
101 Revenue Act of 1964, § 226(b) (3), 78 Stat. 19, INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954,
§ 614(b) (3).
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owning operating mineral interests agree to have the interests operated on
a unified basis and further agree to share in the production on a stipulated
percentage or fractional basis regardless . . . which interest or interests
• . . [produce] the oil." '0 2  Such an agreement can also exist when a
taxpayer who holds "mineral interests in several leases . . . [agrees]
with his several royalty owners to determine the royalties payable to each
on a stipulated percentage basis regardless . which lease or leases
[produce] the oil." 103
Under a voluntary or involuntary unitization or pooling agreement,
the participating operating interests of a taxpayer are treated as one
property with the restriction that, if the plan is voluntary, the participating
interests must be "in the same deposit or . . in two or more deposits,
the joint development . . . of which is logical, without taking the tax
benefits into account, from the standpoint of geology, convenience, eco-
nomy, or conservation." 104 Moreover, the interests in a voluntary agree-
ment must be on contiguous tracts of land or in close proximity. 1 5 These
limitations were imposed to prevent development of unitization agreements
solely designed to achieve the kind of tax benefits obtained under the
"operating unit" rule. It is permissible, however, for a taxpayer to treat
those of his interests participating in a unitization agreement as separate
properties if he had done so prior to 1964, and if it was proper under the
law at the time of the agreement. 10 6
Though Congress did benefit the taxpayer by allowing this added
amount of aggregation, it also restricted what the pre-1964 cases had
allowed. One such case was BeIridge Oil Co. v. Commissioner.1 7 There
a taxpayer wanted to take cost depletion on property recently acquired at
a high cost. The property was placed in a unitization agreement with
another property having no basis, and under the agreement each party
was to receive distributions in proportion to the production of each party
in the deposit prior to the unitization agreement. The taxpayer took cost
depletion on the income derived from the high cost property and percentage
depletion on the property without any basis. The Commissioner, however,
contended that a tax free exchange had occurred in which two separate
properties were exchanged for a single new interest, and that therefore
only one method of depletion could be applied to the whole property. The
Tax Court, however, held for the taxpayer, and the decision was affirmed
by the circuit court. The circuit court stated that no taxfree exchange
occurred because unitization was merely an agreement as to how parties
would use what they already had.
102 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.614-8(b) (5), 30 Fed. Reg. 2669 (1965).
103 Ibid.
104 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.614-8(b) (2), 30 Fed. Reg. 2669 (1965).
105 Ibid.
106INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 614(b) (3) (C).
10727 T.C. 1044 (1957), aff'd, 267 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1959) ; cf. Earl v. Whit-
well, 28 T.C. 372 (1957), rev'd on other grounds, 257 F.2d 548 (5th Cir. 1958).
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A similar and more recent decision is Winfield Killam.18 In that case
the taxpayer owned three separate leases, took percentage depletion on
one lease and calculated cost depletion on the other two. In a unitization
agreement entered into by the taxpayer in 1954, the three leases were
joined. The court held, following the BeIridge case, that the taxpayer
did not lose its right to claim depletion on the separate leases as its
separate properties by reason of the agreement. Thus the 1964 Act has
eliminated the confusion of the Beiridge and Killam cases for future years,
though the courts must still resolve the question for agreements made in
past years.
V. PRESENT STATUS OF PROPERTY
Although the basic definition of "property" has remained fairly con-
stant since its establishment by the Service in the earlier Regulations and
accompanying memoranda, the limits of aggregation underwent sweeping
revision in 1954 with the advent of the "operating unit" concept. The
enactment of the 1964 Revenue Act marks the return with certain modifi-
cations of the 1939 lease-rule and the abrogation of the "operating unit"
concept for the oil and gas industry. The present rule, that all of the
taxpayer's operating mineral interests in a separate tract or parcel of land
must be treated as a single property unless he elects to treat the interests
as separate,10 9 differs only slightly from the 1939 lease-rule. One modifi-
cation is that formerly the taxpayer treated his interests in a tract or
parcel of land as separate unless he elected to combine, while now he must
treat his operating mineral interests as combined unless he elects to keep
them separate." 0 And while the former lease-rule applied to the "interests"
of the taxpayer, distinguishing between "different" interests, the new
lease-rule applies to "operating mineral interests," and distinguishes be-
tween "operating" and "nonoperating mineral interests." I
The modified lease-rule, however, follows many of the principles
established by its predecessor under the 1939 Regulations, and provides
that operating mineral interests in one tract of land cannot be combined
with those in another tract geographically separated from the former."
2
The separation by conveyancing rule also has retained its vitality and
prohibits the aggregation of grants or conveyances from separate persons. 1 3
Furthermore, operating and nonoperating mineral interests cannot be
combined, since they represent "different" interests." 4 Because of these
108 39 T.C. 680 (1963).
10 9 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 614(b) (1), (b) (2).
110 Ibid.
Il INT. Rzv. CoDE OF 1954, §§614(b), (e).
112 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 614(b) (1) (B).
"3 Treas. Reg. § 1.614-1 (a) (3) (1961).
"14 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.614-8(a) (1), 30 Fed. Reg. 2667 (1965).
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similarities between the modified lease-rule and its predecessor, Congress
permits a taxpayer who has arranged his interests under the 1939 rules
to maintain his arrangement for taxable years after December 31, 1963.115
As previously noted, an exception to the modified lease-rule exists
in the case of unitization and pooling agreements. The taxpayer must
aggregate all of his operating mineral interests that participate in one of
these agreements." 6 Therefore, whether the interests are separated geo-
graphically or are separately conveyed is of no concrn to the taxpayer.
The mere fact of participation establishes the necessity for aggregation.
Re-establishment of the lease-rule, with the above modifications,
appears to be the wisest action that Congress could have taken. The rule
is the best one for the oil and gas industry, since it is based on a legal
form with which the industry is most familiar. Furthermore, the rule
can be administered with relative ease, and the industry, in 1939, was
content with its definiteness and results. The problems that remain today
concerning aggregation rules are the result of the years from 1954 to 1963
during which the "operating unit" concept was in effect. In addition to
the natural planning problems that arise whenever a businessman must
change a method which he has used and relied on for ten years, the 1964
Revenue Act also forces the industry to confront the problem of disjoining
the now invalid 1954 aggregations, and allocating the basis of the invalid
aggregations to the separated interests. In reality, since most of the
bases of the aggregations, if not all, have been eliminated by the depletion
allowances, the taxpayers will not be overburdened by this task.
As a result of the 1964 amendments the taxpayer must also redeter-
mine which properties to combine, and which to keep separate under the
modified lease-rule. Data will now have to be collected to help the tax-
payer decide the amount of production, operating expenses, drilling costs,
etc. attributable to the numerous individual interests that are created.
Although these tasks will inconvenience many large producers, Congress
has changed the election rules to aid the producers in determining which
aggregations to make. The taxpayer can now wait until the year of the
first expenditure for drilling or development instead of making the deter-
mination at the time of the first exploration expense." 7  This gives the
taxpayer extra time to decide which interests should be combined, and
which should be kept separated.
The most serious problem facing the producers of oil and gas is
settling the issue of defining an "operating unit" for the years 1954-1963.
If a producer had aggregated during those ten years, he must still prove
that his aggregations were within the letter of the Code. Those who
115 INT. RE'v. CODE OF 1954, § 614(b) (5).
116 INT. Rzv. CoDE OF 1954, § 614(b) (3). Section 614(b) (3) (C) of the 1954
Internal Revenue Code, however, allows taxpayer to continue treating separately
such interests which for any year before January 1, 1964 the taxpayer properly
treated as separate interests.
117 INT. R-v. CoDE oF 1954, § 614(b) (4).
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reached an agreement with the Service have discovered that their efforts
were short-lived since the aggregation rules no longer apply to them.
With the aid of the guidelines recently issued by the Service,118 however,
it is hoped that much of the conflict will be resolved.
CONCLUSION
Once the burdensome task of breaking up the 1954 aggregations is
completed, the modified lease-rule will more realistically represent the
financial and physical structure of the oil and gas industry. Furthermore,
because of the changes in election procedures and in the handling of
unitization agreements, producers will be in a better situation than they
were under the 1939 lease-rule. Perhaps, however, one further refinement
of the lease-rule could be made to eliminate the existence of an unnecessary
distinction. The following hypothetical situation demonstrates the problem
that this refinement would be designed to solve.
Suppose that a decedent divided a plot of his land containing a
mineral deposit into three separate parts, leaving one part to each of his
three sons in his will. Is it possible for a lessee to take leases from the
three beneficiaries, and then treat the land covered by the leases as one
property? The lessee is unable to consider areas included in separate leases
from separate owners as a single tract of land because each lease is a
separate property for purposes of computing the depletion allowance. If
the lessee, after acquiring the land, sublet the three properties under one
sublease, the sublessee would have one tract of land which could be con-
sidered as one property. Would it have made a difference if the bene-
ficiaries were each given an undivided one third interest in the property?
Since the three beneficiaries own a single plot of land jointly, it is possible
that the lessee would be able to consider the plot obtained by the three leases
as a single property. A court, not following the Regulations, might over-
look the number of conveyances in this situation and direct its attention
to the physical unit involved since the leases do not cover separate parts
of land, but rather an indivisible part of the same land. The lessee, in
order to "lease" the property, is required to obtain three separate leases,
but in developing the land it is impossible to determine on whose property
the lessee is operating.
Perhaps, it might he more in line with the business structure of the
oil and gas industry to make a change in the Regulations in order to
avoid the results of the above hypothetical situation. It appears artificial
to permit, a lessee to treat leases obtained at the same time from a lessor
as a single property,' while requiring that the lessee treat as separate
properties the leases acquired from separate owners covering the identical
land. The Regulations construing section 614(a) should also contain a
statement providing that leases, which pertain to contiguous plots of land,
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acquired at the same time, from separate persons, and requiring the
development solely of a single deposit or solely of deposits common to
each lease, constitute a single property. Such a provision would avoid the
unnecessary distinctions, and would recognize the unitary operation re-
quired in removing oil and gas from a single deposit. The "contiguity"
requirement and the "single deposit" requirement will also prevent the
taxpayer from taking undue advantage of this rule as he could under the
"operating unit" concept, so that no new tax benefit will be given to oil
and gas producers.119  At present, there is no need to add any further
incentives in the form of tax benefits to the oil and gas industry's already
substantial percentage depletion allowance. This allowance more than
adequately fulfills such present requirements as (1) the industry's constant
need for new capital to pour back into development and research; (2)
compensation of the producers for the high risk element involved in the
search for new resources, and (3) provision of a rate of return on invested
capital comparable to that of other industries. On the other hand, the
enormous growth of the industry and its production of a huge surplus of oil
and gas present substantial reasons for declining any further governmental
aid.
Fred E. Newberg t
119 It might prove beneficial for Congress to re-examine the aggregation rules
pertaining to the hard mineral producers. Although the percentage depletion allowance
is much smaller for these producers than that used for the oil and gas industry, a
recent case demonstrates the enormous tax benefits that can be obtained by use of
§ 614(c) of the 1954 Code, a very liberal section on aggregation which pertains only to
the hard mineral industry. See Day Mines, 42 T.C. 337 (1964). Perhaps Congress
can justify these tax benefits because it believes that the industry requires incentives
to encourage greater development of resources.
t Mr. Newberg graduated from the University of Pennsylvania Law School in
the Class of 1965.
